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Don't Count Them Out Just Yet:
Toward the Plausible Use of Race-
Preference Student Assignment
Plans
Leslie Yalof Garfield
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 could serve to broaden the permissible use
of race beyond the boundaries presently permitted by the Court.
In this highly fractionalized decision, five justices ultimately
agreed that the race-based student assignment plans before their
review could not withstand judicial scrutiny. One of these justices,
Justice Kennedy, agreed with the plurality's conclusion, but
rejected the plurality's assessment that it is never permissible to
use race-preference student assignment plans absent evidence of
de jure segregation. His concurrence, when read together with the
reasoning of the Court's four dissenting justices, offers a plausible
scenario under which future courts could find precedential
t. Leslie Yalof Garfield, Prof. of Law, Pace Law School
1. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,137 E Supp.
2d 1224, 1226 (WD. Wash. 2001), rev'd, 285 E3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002),
injunction granted, No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th
Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), reh'ggranted, 294 F3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), certifying
questions to Wash. Sup. Ct., 294 E3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions
answered, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev'd, 377 E3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), affd, 426 E3d 1162 (9th Cir.
2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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support to uphold challenged race-preference student assignment
plans as constitutionally permissible.
When the Court considered Parents Involved, the
applicable law for evaluating equal protection challenges under
the Fourteenth Amendment was fairly well settled. A plan or
program that considered race to achieve diversity in a particular
governmental setting would'survive a challenge to its legality
only if it passed the Court's strict scrutiny test.2 Under this test,
a defending governmental agency was required to demonstrate
that its program served a compelling governmental interest and
that the program or policy was narrowly tailored to meet that
interest.'
The Court had previously articulated two seemingly distinct
instances in which a government agency could prove a compelling
governmental interest: remedying the present effect of past
discrimination and assuring viewpoint diversity in classrooms of
higher education.' As a general matter, the Court required strong
and specific evidence that a program was created to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination. Thus, in United States v.
Paradise,5 the Court found that the Alabama Department of
Public Safety's one-black-to-one-white promotion plan supported
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 358 (1987)("Un-
questionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts
"fundamental rights" or which contains "suspect classifications" is to be sub-
jected to "strict scrutiny...").
3. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
4. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test
for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 85
NEB. L. REv. 631, 683 (2005) [hereinafter Garfield, Back to Bakke] (noting the
Court's differing treatment of challenges aimed at achieving diversity in the
workplace and achieving diversity in the classroom).
5. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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a compelling governmental interest in eradicating discrimination,
since it was adopted pursuant to a district court consent decree.6
In contrast, the Court held in City of Richmond v. Croson7 that
the city of Richmond could not successfully demonstrate proof
of a compelling governmental interest in continuing its program,
which set aside thirty percent of the city's construction funds
for black-owned businesses, since the city could put forth only a
general goal of remedying various forms of past discrimination in
support of the program.8
The Court had also provided a clear test for evaluating when
a program was narrowly tailored. To be narrowly tailored under
the equal protection clause, a race-conscious admissions program
could not unduly burden individuals who were not members of
the favored racial and ethnic groups. 9 The Paradise Court best
articulated the "narrowly tailored prong" of the strict scrutiny
test. A reviewing court must consider (1) the necessity for the
relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility
and duration of the relief; (3) the relationship between the
numerical goals and the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact
of the relief upon the rights of third parties.10 Where education
is concerned, however, the Court defined a different test. In both
6. Id. at 153; see Garfield, Back to Bakke, supra note 4 (citing United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1987)).
7. 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989).
8. Id. at 511.
9. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Richmond v. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (plurality opinion); See also USCA Const. Amend 14.
10. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171; see also Sheet Metal Workers v.
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 487 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
Vol. IO:SE
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Grutter v. Bollinger" and Gratz v. Bollinger 2 , the Court endorsed
Justice Powell's language in University of California v. Bakke,13
finding that policies that consider race as a plus and that allow for
individual consideration of each applicant's attributes in relation
to all other applicants are sufficiently narrowly tailored.'4 The
use of quotas, or other numeric goals would violate the narrowly
tailored prong. 15 Thus, in Grutter, the Court found that the law
school's policy of engaging in "a highly individualized holistic
review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all
the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational
environment" did not sufficiently insulate one particular racial
or ethnic group to defeat the narrowly tailored test. 6 The Court,
however, found that the University of Michigan's Liberal Science
and Arts schools plan, which assigned points based solely on
membership in an underrepresented minority class, was not
narrowly tailored because of its inflexible nature. 17
It was against this legal landscape that the Court decided
Parents Involved. The Parents Involved case considered two separate
challenges to local school board race-preference student assignment
plans. The Court chose to hear Parents Involved with another case,
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-315 (1978).
14. Id. at 123 ("The Court endorses Justice Powell's view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest in the context of university admissions.");
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 270-271 (discussing the importance of Justice Powell's
opinion that race can be considered a plus in the admissions process).
15. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289.
16. Id. at 309.
17. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271.
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Meredith v. Jefferson County Pub. Schools,18 because they presented
the same issue: whether a school board could consider race in a
voluntary student assignment plan absent a court order.'9 20
In Parents Involved,21 the plaintiffs, a not-for-profit group of
parents and community members,22 challenged a city program
aimed at achieving diversity in its ten public high schools.2 3
Originally, the City of Seattle School District assigned students to
a particular school based upon their neighborhoods. This student
assignment plan resulted in de facto segregation in the schools and
yielded a disproportionate mix among African American, Asian
American, Latino, and Native American students.24 In an effort
18. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 E Supp. 2d 834
(WD. Ky. 2004), affd, 416 E3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom.,
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006), rev'dsub
nom., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at
2746. (2007).
19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007).
20. The decision also abrogated Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 E3d 1
(1st Cir. 2005) (upholding race-based assignments plan).
21. For a more detailed discussion of the Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, see generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Envisioning the
Glass Half Full: The Future of Race Preference Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SUP_ AM.
L. 385 (2008) [hereinafter Garfield, Glass HalfFull].
22. See Parents Involved in Community Schools, http://www.piics.org (last
visited Apr. 14, 2007)). The parents involved mission statement provides,
"We are a group of parents and community members who believe in promot-
ing neighborhood public schools in the Seattle Public School District. Every
child should have the right to attend their neighborhood school, if that is their
choice." Id.
23. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1225-26.
24. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 426 E3d at 1166. At the time of the
Parents Involved decision, approximately 70 percent of Seattle residents were
white and approximately 30 percent were nonwhite. Id. Seattle's public school
system students were comprised of approximately 40 percent white and 60 per-
cent nonwhite. Id. Approximately 84 percent of all African American students,
Vol. 10:SE
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to diversify its high schools, the Seattle School Board allocated the
available spaces in each of its five high schools according to the
choice of the individual pupils, regardless of the neighborhood in
which they lived.25 When a school was oversubscribed, the Seattle
School Board chose who could attend that school based upon a
series of four tiebreakers, the second of which was race.26
In Meredith, the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky considered whether the 2001 Jefferson County school
assignment plan, which the courts termed "the Louisville Plan,"
violated the Equal Protection Clause.27 The 2001 Plan mandated
74 percent of all Asian American students, 65 percent of all Latino students,
and 51 percent of all Native American students lived in the same area, south
of downtown Seattle. Id.
25. Id. at 1169. A majority of the city's nonwhite students live south of
downtown, and, as a result, the schools located in those neighborhoods were
disproportionately segregated. See id. at 1166. As a result, the district has his-
torically struggled with racial isolation among its individual neighborhoods.
Id. Students list the high school they would like to attend in order of prefer-
ence. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch., 137 E Supp. 2d. at 1226. Approximately
82 percent of students entering high school in 2000 selected one of five schools
as their first choice. Id.
26. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 426 F.3d at 1169. Consideration is first
given to students who have siblings in the school. Second, the school used a
racial tie-breaker. If following that, the school resulted in a student body that
resulted in more than a 15% racial make-up the race of a student is considered.
Id. at 1169-1170. Third, students were admitted according to the distance be-
tween their home and the school, and if there is still room left in the particular
school, then, fourth the school district used a lottery. The lottery, however, was
"virtually" never used. Id. at 1173.
27. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 836. Four families brought suit against
the Louisville School district. Among them, plaintiff David McFarland filed
on behalf on his two sons, Stephen and Daniel; both were denied entry to
traditional schools. Id. at 838 n.3. Plaintiff Crystal Meredith filed on behalf of
her son Joshua McDonald, who was unable to enroll in his school of residence
because it was filled to capacity; he was denied admittance because it would
have had an adverse effect on the racial composition of the original school he
was attending. Id. at 837-38. The Court ruled that with the exception of Met-
2008
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that each public school seek a black student enrollment of at
least fifteen percent and no more than fifty percent. 28 Students in
the system were permitted to choose the school they wanted to
attend.29 Like the Seattle plan, when a particular school was over-
subscribed, school administrators selected students for assignment
to a school based upon a variety of factors, including race.3"
Each case made its way through the federal court system. The
District Court for the District of Washington granted summary
judgment in in favor of the Seattle School Board.3 Parents Involved
edith, none of the plaintiffs denied entry to the traditional school had proven
sufficient injury to support their claims. Id. at 838. McFarland subsequently
appealed. McFarland, 416 F.3d at 513. For a general discussion of the Mer-
edith case, see generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Adding Colors to the Chameleon:
Why the Supreme Court May Adopt a New Compelling Governmental Interest
Test for Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans, 56 KA N. L. REv. 277 (2008)
[hereinafter Garfield, Colors to the Chameleon].
28. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
29. Schools were divided into three types: traditional magnet schools, non-
traditional magnet schools, and residential type schools called resides schools.
Id. The school board assigned students to a "resides school," based on the resi-
dence of their parent or guardian. Id. at 843-43. Traditional magnet schools
offer the regular curriculum in a particular environment and are not consid-
ered "resides schools." Id. at 845-46. With the exception of two schools, each
traditional school has its own geographic zone. Id. at 846. Students may apply
for admission to a traditional school in their zone. Non-traditional magnet
schools offer "specialized programs and curricula." Id. at 843. Students may
apply for admission to any non-traditional magnet schools in the district re-
gardless of their residential area. Id. See also Garfield, Glass Half Full, supra
note 21 at 406.
30. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 847. Fac-
tors included place of residence, school capacity, and program popularity. Id.
If, after all other considerations, the school remained over-subscribed, the
school board composed four random draw lists; one list each for black males,
black females, white males and white females. Id.
31. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
Vol. IO:SE
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appealed.3 2 After winding its way through the court system,33
the Ninth Circuit considered the merits of the case.34 The court
agreed with the district court, finding a compelling governmental
interest in promoting diversity in the Seattle school classrooms
and an interest in avoiding the harm that results from racially
concentrated schools.35 The Court of Appeals also found that the
program's use of a raced based tiebreaker was narrowly tailored.36
Parents Involved appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.3 7
In contrast to the District Court in Washington, the District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky struck down as
unconstitutional that portion of the Louisville plan that assigned
applicants to traditional schools based upon race, because it was
32. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 285 F.3d 1236 (9" Cir. 2002).
33. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1236
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (withdrawal of opinion on grant of rehearing); Parents
Involved in Cmty Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 1084 (9"
cir. 2002)(certification of question to Supreme Court of Washington as to
whether use of racial tie-breaker based on race or ethnicity violated state stat-
ute); Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P3d 151
(Wash. 2002); Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (withdrawing opinion and vacating injunction);
F.3d 949, (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing and remanding with instructions to issue
injunction); Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 395
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005)(ordering rehearing en banc).
34. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
35. Id. at 1178. The District is entitled to pursue the benefits of racial diver-
sity and avoid the harms of segregation in the absence of a court order deeming
it in violation of the Constitution." Id. at 1179.
36. Id. at 1188-90. The tiebreaker policy was necessary and the most race
neutral alternative since the tiebreaker preference allowed the realization of the
compelling interests and discouraged a return to enrollment patterns based on
racially segregated housing patterns. See id.
37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct.
2351 (2005) (granting cert.).
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not narrowly tailored to meet the stated objective of achieving
diversity in the classroom.38 The Supreme Court, wishing to
decide the Meredith and Parents Involved cases together, took
certiorari directly from the Western District.39
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the "majority" opinion,
which Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito joined.4" Justice Kennedy
was the swing vote, concurring in the judgment, but agreeing
with only part of the plurality's reasoning.41 Justices Breyer wrote
a dissent, which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter joined.42
Because the plans under consideration were voluntary and
were not created in response to a court order, the parties could
not justify their policies as necessary to remedy the present effects
of past discrimination.43 The Court then considered whether the
plans met its previously identified interest in achieving viewpoint
diversity in education.44 The plurality dismissed the compelling
governmental interest limb of achieving viewpoint diversity in the
38. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 864
(W.D. Ky. 2004) (finding that the 2001 Louisville Plan was not narrowly
tailored because "(1) the assignment process put Black and White applicants
on separate assignment tracks, and (2) the use of the separate lists appeared
completely unnecessary to accomplish the Board's goals.").
39. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (Jun. 6, 2006) (No. 05-908).
40. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent questioning the need for strict
scrutiny. Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas' concurrence
questioned the dissent's wisdom as to allowing local school boards to define
what is compelling. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Justice Thomas'
opinion, racial imbalance is not the same as segregation, and racial imbalance
can never justify infringing on the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2775.
41. Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 2797 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2752.
44. Id. at 2753; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
Vol. 10:SE
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classroom as inapplicable and asserted that such considerations,
first raised in Bakke and then reaffirmed in Grutter and Gratz
were unique to "institutions of higher education."45
The plurality suggested that the only time it would find
the use of race justified would be when the governmental
entities defending the policy could establish proof of de jure
segregation.46 Thus, without evidence that a previous government
had taken affirmative steps to create racial segregation or that a
consent decree or court order had mandated that the state take
steps to reverse identified discrimination, it would never find a
compelling governmental interest.4 7 Under the plurality's analysis,
a desire to remedy de facto segregation is not enough to justify
the use of race-preference policies. 48 Nor was it sufficient to retain
a program to assure that a particular school system continued to
guarantee diverse classes.49
45. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2754 (citing Grutter, 539
U.S. at 329). The Court found that Grutter only applied to institutions of
higher education and distinguished institutions of higher education from other
educational facilities, stating that "in light of the expansive freedoms of speech
and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy
a special niche in our constitutional tradition." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46. "The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Con-
stitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegrega-
tion in schooling." Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
47. Id. at 2771. Chief Justice Roberts noted that evidence of de jure segrega-
tion is easily identifiable since, "[in most cases, there either will or will not
have been a state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordinance, or
local administrative policy explicitly requiring separation of the races." Id.
48. Id. at 2761.
49. Id.
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Justice Kennedy joined the plurality but sharply disagreed
with much of its reasoning.50 Justice Kennedy found that the
Louisville and Seattle programs were not narrowly tailored to meet
their identified goals. 51 The Jefferson County Board considered
applicants merely in terms of black or white, while the Seattle
School Board considered applications in terms of non-white or
white.52 In each instance, the plans were drafted based upon widely
drawn categories of specific races and ethnicities. Each school
board's practices did not fit within the Bakke construct, which
promoted "a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics
of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single, though important,
element."53 Justice Kennedy's concurrence provided the fifth vote
that invalidated both the Louisville and the Seattle programs.
Justice Kennedy did not, however, agree with the plurality's
assessment that diversity in education is not a compelling
governmental interest, writing instead: "Diversity, depending on its
meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school
district may pursue." 54 In Justice Kennedy's view, the plurality,
which limited permissible compelling governmental interest to
instances of remedying de jure segregation, was "too dismissive
of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people
have equal opportunity regardless of their race."55 According to
50. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2790-91 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the Court had
jurisdiction in this case, that the matter was subject to strict scrutiny and that
neither school board plan was narrowly tailored).
51. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
52. Id. at 2791.
53. Id. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325).
54. Id. at 2789.
55. Id. at 2791.
Vol. IO:SE
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Justice Kennedy, the plurality was "profoundly mistaken"56 in its
conclusion that "the Constitution mandates that state and local
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation
in schools."57 In his opinion, "[tihis Nation has a moral and
ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating
an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all its
children. 58 Consistent with this view, "a compelling interest exists
in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its
discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue."59 A compelling
interest also exists in achieving a diverse student population,
and school boards may consider race as "one component of
that diversity," though "other demographic factors, plus special
talents and needs, should also be considered."6 Ultimately, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the decision should not prevent school
districts from continuing the important work of bringing together
students of different racial, ethnic and economic backgrounds.
"Due to a variety of factors... neighborhoods in our communities
do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole."61 Although
Justice Kennedy found a compelling governmental interest, he
voted nevertheless to strike down the programs, because the
school boards did not demonstrate that their approaches were the
only means of avoiding racial isolationism.62
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined byJustices Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg, wrote that both the Louisville and Seattle race-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2797.
59. Id. at 2797.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2790-91.
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conscious school board plans withstood the longstanding Court-
mandated test of strict scrutiny.63 Both plans served a compelling
governmental interest 64 and were narrowly tailored. 65 For these
reasons, the dissenting justices voted to uphold the plans.66
Justice Breyer described the "compelling interest" in the
Louisville and Seattle plans as "the school districts' interest in
eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the
degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the district's
schools and each individual student's public school experience. 67
He noted that this compelling interest possesses three essential
elements: "the historical and remedial" element of rectifying
consequences of prior segregation; the "educational" element of
overcoming the "adverse educational effects produced by and
associated with highly segregated schools"; and the "democratic"
element of producing an educational environment that reflects
"the pluralistic society in which our children will live."68 After
considering each element, Justice Breyer determined that the
districts' interest in eradicating primary and secondary public
school segregation involved all three elements. He asked
63. Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer would have used a more
lenient standard than strict scrutiny since the plans do not result in race-based
harm, but concluded that the plans survived even the strictest of scrutiny. Id.
64. Justice Breyer disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that a compelling
governmental interest in instances other than in higher education is limited to
remedying de jute rather than de facto segregation. Id. at 2802, 2810. Both
school districts were "highly segregated in fact" prior to the districts' desegrega-
tion plans and thus were in need of a remedy. Id. at 2802.
65. Id. at 2825.
66. See id. at 2800-37.
67. Id. at 2820.
68. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct at 2820-21 (quotation omit-
ted).
Vol. 10:SE
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rhetorically, "[if] an educational interest that combines these three
elements is not 'compelling,' then what is?" 69
In addition to concluding that the districts' plans addressed
a compelling interest, also concluded that the plans were narrowly
tailored. 71 The plans limited the use of race and also strongly
relied upon other non-race conscious elements. The history and
the manner in which the districts developed and modified their
approaches further supported a finding that they were narrowly
tailored. As support to show that the racial balancing programs
were narrowly tailored, Justice Breyer cited the fact that each
school board had devised a plan that imposed a lesser burden than
previous court-approved plans, and that the school boards had a
lack of reasonably evident alternatives.71
Synthesizing Justice Kennedy's concurrence with Justice
Breyer's dissent yields a fairly definitive strict scrutiny test for
evaluating future race-preference challenges, a test which is
supported by a majority of the Court. Justice Kennedy premised
69. Id. at 2823. Justice Breyer disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that a
compelling governmental interest in instances other than in higher education
should be limited to remedying de jure rather than de facto segregation. Id. at
2802, 2810. He concluded that the distinction is "meaningless in the present
context." Id. at 2802. Irrespective of the cause, he pointed out, both school
districts were "highly segregated in fact" prior to the districts' desegregation
plans and thus were in need of a remedy. Id. at 2802. The plurality counters
that the dissent "elides this distinction between de jute and de facto segrega-
tion," and that the distinction between segregation by state action and racial
imbalance caused by other factors "has been central to our jurisprudence in
this area for generations" Id. at 2761 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
280 n.14 (1977)). In the present cases, argued the plurality, race-conscious
remedies were inappropriate because the Seattle school district was never segre-
gated by law and the Louisville district had previously been deemed "unitary"
by a federal court. Id.
70. Id. at 2824.
71. Id. at 2829-30.
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his need for a compelling governmental interest on the societal
promise that all children are assured an equal education regardless
of race.72 His opinion suggests that there exists a constitutional
mandate that the Court not disassemble programs that were created
to redress previous wrongs. 73 Justice Kennedy would also extend
the compelling governmental interest in diversity education, first
articulated in Bakke, to schools at the K-12 grade levels.
Justice Breyer, writing for three other justices, agreed
with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that there is a compelling
governmental interest in honoring the historic commitment the
Court has made to eradicating segregation.74 Indeed, this fear
of eradicating the strides school boards have made since Brown
v. Board of Education75 was of evidently paramount concern to
Justices Breyer and Ginsberg during oral arguments. In their view,
anything short of upholding the challenged student assignment
plans would mean that "what is constitutional one day is no longer
constitutional the next. 76
Justice Kennedy's concurrence coupled with the views of those
in the dissent present two instances of a compelling governmental
interest. First, the justices would find a compelling governmental
interest in ensuring viewpoint diversity in grades K-12. Justice
Bryer recognized the democratic interest in producing an
educational environment that reflects the "pluralistic society" in
which our children live and learn. Quoting Grutter, he wrote that
diverse classrooms "promote cross-racial understanding, helps
72. Id. at 2791.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2802.
75. Id. at 2816.
76. Adam Liptak, Brown v. Board of Education, Second Round, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2006 (quoting Justice Ginsburg).
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to break down racial stereotypes, and enable [students] to better
understand persons of different races."77 Justice Kennedy agreed
with the dissent writing that there is a compelling governmental
interest in encouraging "a diverse student body, one aspect of
which is its racial composition."7 8 These five justices would
extend to grades K- 12 the Court's identified interest in assuring a
compelling governmental interest in assuring diverse classrooms.
The five justices would also find a compelling governmental
interest in retaining programs, the dismantling of which would
result in a return to the evil that the challenged program was
originally created to redress. The need to retain such programs is
most evident when considered in relation to race-based student
assignment plans, many of which have their genesis in court
ordered desegregation plans.79 In many ways, these programs are
a safeguard against a return to segregated classrooms.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence echoed demographic studies
that show that a failure to use student assignment plans has
inevitably led to the racial, ethnic and socio-economic segregation
of public schools.8 ° Most school systems use neighborhood
student assignment plans, which assign students to classes based
upon housing patterns. These plans draw school zones that are
based upon the geographical location of a particular school and
the proximity of a student's home to that school. But, as Justice
77. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S.Ct. at 2821.
78. Id. at 2792.
79. Id. at 2749. The Louisville plan was originally created in response to a
court ordered desegregation plan and was only dismantled in 2000 "when the
District Court dissolved the decree after finding that the district had achieved
unitary status by eliminating "[tlo the greatest extent practicable" the vestiges
of its prior policy of segregation. Id. (citing Hampton v. Jefferson Cry. Bd. of
Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (2000).
80. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2795.
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Kennedy pointed out, "neighborhoods in our communities ... do
not reflect the diversity of our nation as a whole."81 In 2000, the
typical neighborhood of a white metropolitan resident was eighty
percent white." De facto segregation that occurs as a result of
individual housing selection or that is dictated by neighborhood
housing prices and affordability means that, absent a student
assignment plan, the retreat to segregated schools becomes
inevitable. For these reasons, a school board in a geographically
segregated community, such as Jefferson County or Seattle,
would most certainly be able to present evidence of a compelling
governmental interest.
Even if a future court were to adopt the compelling
governmental interest advanced by a majority of its current
members and the defending governmental entity could support
that interest through evidence, there would still be no guarantees
that a proposed program would withstand constitutional scrutiny.
To establish the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, a defending
party must prove that the designed program was narrowly tailored.
Under the narrowly tailored prong, a defending party show that
its program is among the least restrictive alternatives to solving
the identified program.83
81. Id. at 2795.
82. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REv. 277, 277 (2007); see
Michael A. Stevens, Down but Not Out: How School Districts May Utilize Race-
Conscious Student Assignments in the Wake of Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (unpublished).
83. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 339 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 n.6)("narrow tailoring 'require[s] consideration' of
'lawful alternative and less restrictive means"').
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The Court has rarely found programs using race to be
narrowly tailored.84 Even so, the four dissenting justices in Parents
Involved found that the Seattle and Louisville plans were more
narrowly tailored than plans the Court had previously found
constitutionally valid. At the outset, Justice Breyer, writing for the
dissent, subjected the plan to the "rigorous judicial review" that
Justice Kennedy called for in his dissent in Grutter.85 Even under
such rigorous review, the dissent concluded, the program was
narrowly tailored. With regard to these plans, "(1) their limited
and historically-diminishing use of race, (2) their strong reliance
upon other non-race-conscious elements, (3) their history and
the manner in which the districts developed and modified their
approach, (4) the comparison with prior plans, and (5) the lack of
reasonably evident alternatives together show that the districts'
plans are 'narrowly tailored. 86
Justice Kennedy did not brush with such broad strokes when
considering the narrowly tailored test. In fact, it was because of
this prong that the program seemed to fail.87 The failure of each
school board to make individual considerations, as mandated by
Grutter, or merely to consider race as one of several factors, as
Justice Powell mandated in Bakke, meant that the program did
not meet the Court's previously articulated narrowly tailored
test. In his concurrence, however, Justice Kennedy wrote that
while decisions fashioned solely upon the basis of a systematic,
individual typing by race fail under the narrowly tailored test,
84. See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact. An Em-
pirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793
(2006).
85. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2829-30.
87. Id.
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a school board could construct a plan that satisfied the second
prong of the strict scrutiny test.88 Justice Kennedy even went so
far as to suggest other means that he might find appropriate to
meet the narrowly tailored test, such as strategic site selection of
new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition
of the demographics of neighborhoods; recruiting students
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments and
performance.89
Justice Kennedy's identified instances of appropriately
narrowly tailored programs seem to comprise the least common
denominator among those justices that would allow for race-based
student assignment plans. A defending school board, therefore,
could succeed if its program allowed for individual review of
each student or if the school drew attendance zones or placed
new schools in sites that were strategically selected to draw from a
diverse group of students.
Justice Kennedy's offer to find programs narrowly tailored
if they are based upon strategic site selections and creatively
districted school zones is hollow in many ways. The de facto
segregation that plagues American neighborhoods makes diversity
based upon this plan virtually impossible to achieve. County-wide
and metropolitan school districts have been successful in creating
desegregation. In such instances, the school board may draw from
across a large group of students in a population.9" These plans,
88. Id. at 2792.
89. Id.
90. See Mark C. Rahdert, Obstacles and Wrong Turns on the Roadfrom Brown:
Milliken v. Bradley and the Quest for Racial Diversity in Education, 13 TEM.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 785, 800 (2004 )(citing GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E.
EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 73-143 (1996)(the countywide or metropolitan school
districts in metro Charlotte and metro Raleigh, North Carolina, for producing
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however, have generally been successful in response to mandatory
desegregation plans and have involved cross-county bussing,
rather than neighborhood assignment.91 For local school boards,
Justice Kennedy's suggestion is significantly more problematic. In
these instances, where the school system is limited to one town,
the school board does not have as diverse a population from which
to draw.92
School boards would be better advised to rely on individual
considerations to assure that the racial balance of each class is
adequate to meet the dual compelling governmental interest of
assuring that all students have an equal education and that the
schools in the particular district do not become re-segregated if
the local school board's authority to assign students to classes is
removed. The notion of individual choice as a precondition to
assuring that the program is narrowly tailored originated with
Justice Powell in the Bakke decision. In that case, Justice Powell
wrote that race or ethnic background may be deemed a "plus" in
a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats. 3
Most public schools do engage in an individual review of sorts. The
"large scale mandatory desegregation across city and suburban lines and sub-
stantial growth in both the overall district and white enrollment, with minority
enrollment up 18% and white enrollment soaring 37% since 1976.").
91. See Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Prefer-
ences, 103 MICH. L. REv., 1273 (2005).
92. Tracy Miller, Desegregation and the Meaning of Equal Education Oppor-
tunity, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 555 (1982) (citing Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267 (1977)). Although meaningful desegregation was practically
impossible without some sort of multi-district remedy since the Detroit district
was overwhelmingly black, the Court maintained that a more effective remedy
would be improper, stressing the importance of local autonomy, and the need
for judicial restraint. Id.
93. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
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learning styles, personalities, and general dispositions of students
are taken into account when making student assignments, at least
at the elementary or middle school levels. A policy that expands
the personal considerations of an individual to include race, as
one of the other factors schools consider when assigning students
to classrooms, particularly in terms of how race would contribute
to the make-up of a particular class, is virtually identical to the
policy behind the plan the Court approved in Grutter.94
Individual review is only practicable when school boards are
presented with a manageable number of students to consider. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Gratz, acknowledged
that given the enormous number of students who applied to the
University of Michigan undergraduate program, individual review
was not feasible.95 The same Court approved of the University
of Michigan Law School affirmative action admission policy,
because it allowed for individual review. The law school, however,
considered fewer than ten percent of the number of applicants
than did the undergraduate school. Local school boards may be
concerned with more students than there are applicants to the
University of Michigan School of Law, but, for the most part,
these school boards oversee significantly fewer students than the
27,474 students who applied to the University of Michigan in
2007, making the process tenable in most situations.96
The tenuous make-up of the Court's various opinions in
Parents Involved means that no clear precedent has yet emerged
94. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
95. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 ("the fact that the implementation of a program
capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.").
96. Univ. of Mich., U-M Enrollment Up In 2007-08, http://www.ns.urnich.
edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=6152 (Nov. 1, 2007). The school admitted
5,992 students. Id.
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to prohibit race-based policies from surviving the strict scrutiny
test in the future. To be sure, it is very difficult to survive strict
scrutiny. Indeed, the Court's test is considered "strict in theory
but fatal in fact".97 This may not necessarily be the case. A recent
study found that almost thirty percent of governmental programs
survive strict scrutiny." This fact, coupled with the window left
open by Justice Kennedy's concurrence, suggests that a change
in the current Court to replace a current member of the plurality
with one who has more liberal leanings could certainly allow
future courts to uphold race-based policies. For these reasons, the
Parents Involved case is neither strict in theory nor fatal in fact.
97. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Gerald
Gunther first coined the phrase "strict in theory but fatal in fact." Id. In
response, in Bakke, Justice Powell, citing Gunther wrote "our review under
the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict-not 'strict in theory and fatal in
fact."' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362. See also Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
("It is not true that strict scrutiny is strict in theory but fatal in fact."). See
generally Winkler, supra note 84.
98. See generally Winkler, supra note 84.
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